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PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE ATTORNEY’S OBLIGATION TO WARN
OF IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTION
Nicole Sykes
INTRODUCTION
Abigail is a resident of Georgia.1 She immigrated to the United
States and became a lawful permanent resident seventeen years ago.2
She married a United States citizen, and the couple now has three
children.3 Abigail’s life took a devastating twist recently when the
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated
deportation proceedings against her for shoplifting a pack of
cigarettes.4 She committed the crime over ten years ago and entered a
guilty plea after consulting with a defense attorney.5 Under Georgia
law, she received First Offender treatment and the judge sentenced
her to twelve months confinement, suspended.6 Unfortunately,
Georgia’s First Offender treatment does not translate into federal
immigration law and her plea constitutes a conviction.7 When Abigail
applied for citizenship, DHS noted her conviction and initiated
removal proceedings against her.8 If Abigail’s attorney had advised

J.D. Candidate, 2012, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks to Carolina Antonini
for her constant guidance and support and to John and my family for all of their encouragement and
love.
1. This scenario was taken from an article written by Grace Sease and Socheat Chea with minor
changes made to the facts. See Grace A. Sease & Socheat Chea, The Consequences of Pleas in
Immigration Law, 6 GA. B. J. 24, 24–27 (Oct. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-60 (2006) (permitting the court, upon a plea of guilty, to defer
proceeding and place a defendant who has never been convicted of a felony on probation or sentence the
defendant without entering a judgment of guilt).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006) (defining an alien’s plea of guilt and some form of courtordered punishment as a “conviction” even if “adjudication of guilt has been withheld”).
8. Sease & Chea, supra note 1. Because Abigail was convicted of a theft offense and sentenced to
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her that her plea would adversely affect her ability to apply for
citizenship or remain in the United States, she may have never
pleaded guilty.9
In Georgia, the courts recognize a noncitizen’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel when an attorney makes an affirmative
misrepresentation as to the immigration consequences of a
conviction or a plea.10 If Abigail had asked her attorney whether she
would face adverse immigration consequences and he had responded
in the negative, the court might vacate her judgment. The Georgia
Supreme Court, however, does not recognize a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel when an attorney fails to inform a client of
potential consequences on the client’s status.11 If Abigail’s attorney
had never asked if she was a citizen and Abigail had never inquired
into the possible immigration consequences, the court might uphold
the judgment.12
Other circuit and state courts have recognized this distinction
between affirmative misrepresentation and a failure to inform,13 with
twelve months confinement, her offense is defined as an aggravated felony. Id. As a lawful permanent
resident convicted of an aggravated felony, she is not eligible for a waiver and her only relief from
deportation is withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Id.
Unfortunately, these forms of relief have a very high threshold that most applicants cannot meet. Id.
9. See Sease & Chea, supra note 1, at 27.
10. Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. 2004) (holding that claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that arise from an attorney’s affirmative misrepresentation to immigration consequences of
criminal activity must be determined by the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington); see Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
11. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 797–98 (finding that the habeas court “erred by failing to distinguish
between a lawyer’s failure to inform his client of the collateral consequences attending a guilty plea and
the affirmative misrepresentation of such consequences”).
12. See NORTON TOOBY, TOOBY’S GUIDE TO CRIMINAL IMMIGRATION LAW: HOW CRIMINAL AND
IMMIGRATION COUNSEL CAN WORK TOGETHER TO PROTECT IMMIGRATION STATUS IN CRIMINAL
CASES 7 (Kerrin Staskawicz ed., 2008) (emphasizing that attorneys must ask every client whether the
client is a noncitizen because a “client with a name like Peter Jackson who speaks perfect colloquial
American English and appears Caucasian may turn out to be a citizen of Canada who has lived here
since he was two years old”).
13. United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25–28 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting the defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to advise him of his plea’s immigration
consequences); United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (adopting the rule that
“counsel’s failure to advise the defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea cannot rise to
the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance” (quoting United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764,
768 (11th Cir. 1985))). But see State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (holding that the
defendant’s counsel had an affirmative obligation to determine the defendant’s immigration status and
advise him on the immigration consequences resulting from his plea).
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some courts finding that even affirmative misrepresentation does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.14 The United States
Supreme Court recognized this inconsistency and sought to correct
this disparity in Padilla v. Kentucky.15 In this case, the Supreme
Court rejected the distinction between affirmative misrepresentations
and a failure to inform and found that noncitizens facing criminal
charges have a right to know that these charges may negatively
impact their immigration status.16
In Abigail’s situation, Padilla v. Kentucky would require that her
attorney not remain silent as to her possible immigration
consequences;17 however, the extent of her attorney’s obligations and
responsibilities remains unclear.18 The majority mandated that
counsel has the “duty to give correct advice” when immigration law
is “truly clear,” and furthermore even if “the law is not succinct and
14. Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985) (declining to hold that
counsel’s affirmative misrepresentation “in response to a specific inquiry by the accused which results
in a plea of guilty necessarily constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel”); Commonwealth v. Padilla,
253 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Ky. 2008) (concluding that counsel’s “act of advising appellee incorrectly
provides no basis for relief” because immigration consequences of a conviction are outside the ambit of
the Sixth Amendment).
15. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“[D]eportation is a particularly severe
‘penalty.’” (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1983))). See Nina Totenberg,
High Court: Lawyers Must Give Immigration Advice, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 31, 2010,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125420249 (“[Benita] Jain, of the Immigrants
Rights’ Project, notes that deportation for an immigrant who’s been here since childhood can mean
being deported to a country where the individual has no family left, where he or she may not speak the
language, and may not know how to ‘get a job, a house or even order a meal.’ And for some immigrants
granted asylum here, deportation may return them to a country where they risk persecution.”).
16. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484 n.11 (“[W]ere a defendant’s lawyer to know that a particular offense
would result in the client’s deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well
be killed due to circumstances in the client’s home country, any decent attorney would inform the client
of the consequences of his plea.”).
17. See id. at 1483. “Lack of clarity in the law, however, does not obviate the need for counsel to say
something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will affect the scope and nature of
counsel’s advice.” Id. at 1483 n.10.
18. See id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion “has no logical
stopping-point”); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (Fall 2010) (asserting that the rationale of Padilla should
extend to other severe consequences of conviction and that this expansion of counsel’s obligations
“represents sound public policy”); Margate Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The
Right to Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 34 CHAMPION 18, 22 (May 2010)
[hereinafter Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel] (“The biggest question mark about Padilla, and its
greatest potential for systemic impact beyond the immigration context, lies in its extension to indirect
legal effects of a plea other than deportation.”).
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straightforward,” an attorney still has the obligation to “advise a
noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of
adverse immigration consequences.”19 Yet, the Supreme Court never
defined “competent” for the purposes of determining effective
assistance of counsel or even how far a criminal defense attorney
must investigate into a client’s immigration status.20
Part I of this Note will initially discuss the noncitizen’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under the Strickland test21 and the two
prongs a defendant must satisfy to raise a successful claim.22 This
Note will then delve into the Padilla v. Kentucky case and the
Supreme Court’s conclusion that criminal defense attorneys cannot
remain silent as to the immigration consequences resulting from a
plea or conviction of criminal charges.23 Part II will analyze the
complex nature of immigration law and the difficulty in applying
Padilla’s “truly clear” test in order to determine whether counsel has
an obligation to advise a client of the adverse immigration
consequences of a plea or conviction.24 Part III will propose that
defender offices establish a comprehensive service plan so defense
attorneys can confidently provide their noncitizen clients information
and advice about the immigration consequences of a plea or

19. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
20. See Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 22–23 (“The Padilla decision will
greatly expand the responsibilities of defense lawyers in counseling and advocating for their clients, and
give impetus to a trend toward ‘a more holistic and comprehensive model of representation.’” (quoting
Robin Steinberg, Supreme Court Ruling Speaks of a New Kind of Criminal Defense, HUFFINGTON POST,
Apr.
5,
2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robin-steinberg/supreme-court-rulingspea_b_522044.html)); see also, e.g., TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8 (“Some clients will conceal noncitizen
status in the mistaken belief that—as noncitizens—they would not qualify for public defender
services. . . . Other clients may honestly believe they are U.S. citizens, since all their brothers and sisters
automatically became citizens when both parents naturalized, but the client was the only one who did
not because s/he was married, over 18, or not a lawful permanent resident at the time of the parents’
naturalization. . . . Counsel must, therefore, not accept a client’s statement s/he is a citizen without
careful verification.”).
21. Under the Strickland test, a convicted defendant who claims that his counsel’s assistance was “so
defective as to require reversal of a conviction” must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient
and that this performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See infra Part II.A–C.
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conviction.25 This will ensure that both noncitizens and the State can
use pleas to their benefit.26
I. THE EXPANSION OF THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
CLAIM FOR NONCITIZENS
A. The Strickland Test and Georgia’s Approach to Noncitizens’
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.27 For a noncitizen to bring an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim and vacate a conviction or plea, the
noncitizen must meet both prongs of the Strickland test.28 A
noncitizen must initially prove that “counsel’s performance was
deficient” to satisfy the first prong.29 Then the noncitizen must show
that the attorney’s “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”30
If a noncitizen cannot meet both prongs, the court will deny the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.31
25. See infra Part III.
26. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
27. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (emphasizing that “‘the right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel’” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771
n.14 (1970))); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.”).
28. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (addressing the meaning of the “constitutional requirement of
effective assistance” and declaring that the “benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel’s conduct . . . undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process . . .”).
29. Id. at 687–89 (concluding that a defendant must show that his counsel’s conduct “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and that scrutiny “must be highly deferential” to counsel’s
performance).
30. Id. at 687. The Court mandated that the standard is “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
31. Id. at 687, 699–700. The Court held that the defendant failed to meet both prongs of the test
when his counsel made the choice to argue extreme emotional distress and rely on the defendant
accepting responsibility for his crime. Id. at 699. Counsel’s unsuccessful choice resulted from
“reasonable professional judgment,” and there was no probability that omitted evidence would have
changed the sentence imposed. Id. at 699–700; see also Roe v. Florres-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000)
(finding error in the court of appeals’ “per se prejudice rule” because it evades the requirement that
counsel’s error “must actually cause the forfeiture of the appeal”: if the defendant cannot establish that
but for the counsel’s error the defendant would have timely appealed, the defendant is not entitled to
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The Georgia Supreme Court recognizes that noncitizens have a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but limits the claim to when
counsel affirmatively misinforms the client.32 In Rollins v. State, the
petitioner pled nolo contendere to a charge of driving under the
influence and pled guilty as a First Offender to a Georgia Controlled
Substance Act violation.33 Before pleading guilty, Rollins, a native of
Barbados, received her attorney’s assurances that the pleas would not
have any adverse consequences on her immigration status or her
desire to become an attorney.34 Following these pleas, Rollins earned
four degrees, including a Juris Doctor degree; passed the Florida Bar
Examination; and received an offer of employment from the state as
a prosecutor.35 Despite her success, the Florida State Bar received a
copy of her guilty plea and held in “abeyance its decision whether to
admit Rollins to the practice of law,” and the Department of
Immigration and Naturalization Services instituted deportation
proceedings against her.36
The Georgia Supreme Court, in considering Rollins’s claim,
emphasized that while a defendant has a right to trial and effective
assistance of counsel, that constitutional obligation does not extend to
collateral consequences such as deportation proceedings.37 The
relief); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60 (1985) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny a hearing
for the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as the petitioner failed to satisfy the
prejudice prong of Strickland when he alleged that, absent counsel’s error, he would have pleaded not
guilty and gone to trial).
32. Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Ga. 2004). The Georgia Supreme Court held that the twoprong test of Strickland must apply to noncitizens’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when
noncitizens allege that counsel affirmatively misinformed them as to the consequences of their guilty
plea. Id. The court permitted the petitioner to withdraw her plea because her case involved the
“affirmative act of giving misinformation to his client” in contrast to a case in which counsel “failed to
inform his client of the collateral consequences.” Id. at 798–800.
33. Id. at 797. The state discovered trace amounts of cocaine on a dollar bill in Rollins’ purse. Id.
She denied any knowledge of the cocaine and claimed she had no idea why it was on the money. Id.
However, because she did not deny the bill came from her purse, on the advice of counsel she entered a
guilty plea. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. Rollins earned an associate degree from Clayton State College and a double-major bachelor’s
degree from Georgia State University. Id.
36. Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred the functions of the Department of
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. This Note will refer to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) since the Act abolished the INS.
37. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 798 (citing Williams v. Duffy, 513 S.E.2d 212 (Ga. 1999); Thompson v.
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defendant establishes an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
regarding collateral repercussions only when he proves counsel gave
erroneous advice or information.38 The Georgia Supreme Court
overturned the habeas court’s decision only because counsel
affirmatively assured his client she would not suffer negative
consequences from her plea.39
Georgia courts do not recognize that noncitizens have a
constitutional right to know all of the collateral consequences of their
pleas or convictions.40 The Georgia Code, however, statutorily
requires courts to “determine whether the defendant is freely entering
the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the
United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her
immigration status.”41 While the statute does not address counsel’s
obligations to their noncitizen clients, the statute demonstrates the
nexus between pleas and a noncitizen’s status and emphasizes the
necessity of noncitizens understanding the consequences to maintain

Greene, 462 S.E.2d 747 (Ga. 1995)). The Supreme Court of Georgia maintained that “there is no
constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of collateral consequences in order for her guilty
plea to be valid.” Id. at 797–98; see also Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678 (2008) (defining collateral consequences as consequences “that
result from some law or regulation that takes the fact of conviction into account in deciding whether to
impose the particular consequence”).
38. Rollins, 591 S.E.2d at 799. The defendant’s counsel failed to perform basic research about the
effects of a plea on deportation proceedings and state bar fitness. Id. Therefore, counsel’s representation
fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. Id.
39. Id. at 798. See State v. Patel, 626 S.E.2d 121, 122–23 (Ga. 2006) (affirming the order to permit
the defendant to withdraw his plea because the defendant had inquired about the impact of a plea on
payors—such as Medicare and Medicaid—and his medical practice, and his counsel “expressly advised”
his plea would not result in any “long-term adverse consequences” on his practice).
40. Christina Hendrix & Olivia Orza, No Second Chances: Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Charges, 13 GA. B.J. 27, 27 (Dec. 2007).
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93(c) (2010) (“[T]he court shall determine whether the defendant is
freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen of the United States, then
the plea may have an impact on his or her immigration status. This subsection shall apply with respect to
acceptance of any plea of guilty to any state offense in any court of this state or any political subdivision
of this state.”). This law applies to all courts in Georgia, including municipal courts. Sease & Chea,
supra note 1, at 24. Courts should ask every defendant whether he is a citizen of the United States. Id. If
the defendant is a noncitizen, the court should ask whether he understands that the plea may impact his
immigration status. Id. A court’s failure to inquire into the defendant’s status and his understanding may
result in a future habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the defendant did not enter in the plea
knowingly or voluntarily. Id.
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the integrity of the plea.42 The legislature, in requiring courts to
instruct noncitizens of potential immigration consequences,
acknowledged the growing immigrant population and the
approximately 900,000 foreign-born individuals living in Georgia.43
B. Padilla v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky44 addressed a situation
similar to the scenario in Rollins. The petitioner, Jose Padilla, had
been a lawful permanent resident for the previous forty years and
served in the Vietnam War.45 Before pleading guilty to the
transportation of a large amount of marijuana, counsel advised him
that he “did not have to worry about Immigration Status since he had
been in the country so long.”46 As a result of this drug conviction, the
defendant was placed in removal proceedings.47 The Court granted
certiorari to address whether, as a matter of law, a noncitizen’s
counsel has an obligation to advise him that pleading guilty would
result in his removal from this country.48 The Court agreed with the
42. See Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40 (noting that the Georgia legislature “recognized the
importance of informing defendants of the consequences of guilty pleas” and amended the Georgia
Code to instruct courts to determine that noncitizens understand that a plea may impact their status).
43. Migration Policy Institute, Georgia: Social and Demographic Characteristics, MPI DATA HUB,
http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/state.cfm?ID=GA (last visited Aug. 3, 2011). In Georgia
between 2000 and 2009, the foreign-born population grew from 577,273 to 920,381. Id. Compare this
59.4% change in Georgia’s population to the national level, where the foreign-born population grew
from 31,107,889 to 38,517,234, a 23.8% change. Id. In Georgia from 2000 to 2009, the number of
persons who obtained legal permanent resident status has increased from 14,707 to 28,396. OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS 16 tbl.4 (2010).
44. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
45. Id. at 1477.
46. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
47. Id. at 1477 n.1 (“[V]irtually every drug offense except for only the most insignificant marijuana
offenses, is a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).”); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
(2006) (“Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or
regulation of a state, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable.”).
48. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla’s petition for relief
because it held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right does not extend to “collateral” consequences
of a plea or conviction. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485). Counsel’s erroneous
advice or failure to inform regarding removal proceedings did not provide Padilla with a basis for relief.
Id.
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petitioner that “constitutionally competent counsel” would have
advised him that his guilty plea would make him subject to amenable
deportation.49
1. Removing Deportation from the Collateral Consequences Label
and Placing It Within the “Ambit of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel”50
When the Kentucky Supreme Court heard Mr. Padilla’s ineffective
assistance of counsel argument, the court denied his claim because it
concluded that advice regarding the risk of deportation is only a
collateral consequence.51 Collateral consequences are not defined in
federal or state statutes but are repercussions of criminal activity that
“stem from the fact of conviction rather than from the sentence of the
court.”52 The Kentucky Supreme Court held that while a defendant
has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, that right does not extend to
collateral consequences of a plea or conviction.53 Therefore, an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on an attorney’s
incorrect advice about immigration consequences has no
constitutional relief.54
The United States Supreme Court noted that many courts similarly
distinguish between direct and collateral consequences but failed to
determine whether that distinction is appropriate under Strickland.55
49. Id. The Supreme Court did not grant Padilla’s relief, because it did not determine whether his
counsel’s erroneous advice prejudiced his defense enough to meet the Strickland test, but instead
remanded his case. Id.
50. Id. at 1482.
51. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485; see Roberts, supra note 37, at 689 (“[T]he lower
courts have developed three different, and largely unsatisfactory, definitions of a ‘direct’ consequence:
(1) whether the consequence is ‘definite, immediate and largely automatic’; (2) whether the
consequence is punitive; and (3) whether the consequence is within ‘the control and responsibility’ of
the sentencing court.” (footnotes omitted)).
52. Roberts, supra note 37 (quoting Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals,
86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634 (2006)).
53. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
54. Id. (“In neither instance [counsel’s failure to advise or advising incorrectly] is the matter required
to be addressed by counsel, and so an attorney’s failure in that regard cannot constitute ineffectiveness
entitling a criminal defendant to relief under Strickland v. Washington.”).
55. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (“Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not
consider in this case because of the unique nature of deportation.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2012

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 15

900

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

Instead the Court noted that the “unique nature of deportation” made
it difficult to “classify as either a direct or collateral consequence.”56
The Court reasoned that it was “‘most difficult’ to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context” and
concluded that most noncitizens also will find it difficult to separate
deportation that results from a conviction from the conviction itself.57
While the Court agreed that deportation is not a criminal sanction but
is civil in nature, it found that deportation “is nevertheless intimately
related to the criminal process.”58 After dismissing the “direct” and
“collateral” label for removal proceedings, the Court refused to
categorically remove it from the “ambit of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel” and overruled the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
decision by determining that the Strickland analysis should apply.59
2. Deportation Proceedings and the Criminal Defense Attorney’s
Obligation
In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient—the
first prong under Strickland—the Supreme Court looked to the
professional norms that guide criminal and immigration attorneys.60
The Court concluded that the “weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding
56. Id. at 1481–82. In discussing the nature of deportation, the Court emphasized that federal law has
expanded deportable offenses and eliminated discretionary relief for many offenses. Id. at 1479–81. In
1990, Congress eliminated the procedure known as judicial recommendation against deportation that
had permitted the sentencing judge to recommend that the government not deport an alien. Id. at 1480.
The Supreme Court noted that if a noncitizen commits a removable offense, his removal “is practically
inevitable” and the Attorney General no longer has the authority to exercise equitable discretion except
for particular classes of offenses in which he may cancel removal. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)
(2006)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006) (declaring that an alien who commits an aggravated felony
“shall be conclusively presumed to be deportable”).
57. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982));
accord Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 32 (“Defendants convicted of certain crimes face possible
removal and, in some cases, complete banishment from the United States. Upon removal, these
defendants are separated from their families and may face persecution upon return to their countries.”).
58. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
59. Id. at 1482; see Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 32 (“Noncitizen defendants facing criminal
charges in the United States are guaranteed certain constitutional rights, such as the right to enter a
knowing and voluntary guilty plea and the right to effective assistance of counsel. To a non-citizen, a
knowing and voluntary plea should encompass the knowledge that, by entering a guilty plea, he or she
may be accepting life-altering immigration consequences.”).
60. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
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the risk of deportation.”61 In analyzing the petitioner’s claim, the
Court concluded that his counsel could have easily determined that a
guilty plea to a drug offense would make him deportable, but instead,
his counsel falsely told him his conviction would not have an effect.62
Using the petitioner as an example, the Supreme Court explained a
defense attorney’s obligation and mandated that when the
“deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the
duty to give correct advice is equally clear.”63 For instances in which
the law is “unclear or uncertain,” the Court stated that a defense
attorney “need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.”64 The Court concluded that in the petitioner’s
situation, the terms of the immigration statute were “succinct, clear,
and explicit in defining the removal consequence” and therefore
easily satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test.65 The Court
61. Id. The Court looked to standards such as the National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s
Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation and the America Bar Association for Criminal
Justice’s Prosecution Function and Defense Function. Id.; see Brief of the National Ass’n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)
(No. 08-651) (hereinafter Brief of the National Ass’n). The National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) guidelines “underscore that competent . . . counsel” must consider immigration
consequences throughout “all stages of the process.” Id. NLADA guidelines accounted for immigration
consequences such as the possibility of deportation at the initial interview stage, the plea bargaining
stage, and the sentencing stage. Id. Contra Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]e
must recognize that such standards may represent only the aspirations of a bar group rather than an
empirical assessment of actual practice.”).
62. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006)) (“Any alien who at any
time after admission has been convicted of a violation (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or
regulation of a State, the United States or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other
than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is
deportable.”).
63. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Although the Solicitor General asked the Supreme Court to hold that
Strickland applies to a noncitizen’s claim only when his counsel provides erroneous advice, the
Supreme Court rejected limiting its holding to “affirmative misadvice.” Id. at 1484. The Court reasoned
that limiting a claim to only situations where counsel gives incorrect advice would give counsel an
incentive to stay silent “on matters of great importance,” and further it would deny advice on
deportation to those clients least able to represent themselves, even though such advice is easily
accessible and available. Id.
64. Id. at 1483. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, dismisses Justice Alito’s concerns
that immigration consequences are frequently unclear and will place too heavy a burden on defense
counsel. Id. at 1483 n.10. Justice Stevens declared that the “[l]ack of clarity in the law . . . does not
obviate the need for counsel to say something about the possibility of deportation, even though it will
affect the scope and nature of counsel’s advice.” Id.
65. Id. at 1483 (“This is not a hard case in which to find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s
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remanded the case for a finding as to whether the petitioner can
demonstrate prejudice as a result of his counsel’s deficient
performance.66
C. Implications of Padilla v. Kentucky
By mandating that criminal defense attorneys must inform their
noncitizen clients of the possibility of deportation before entering
pleas, the Supreme Court attempted to benefit not only noncitizen
defendants but the State as well.67 This decision marked a major
development in upholding noncitizens’ rights to counsel and the
integrity of pleas.68 However, the Court’s requirement that criminal
defense attorneys advise clients when the law is clear fails to
appreciate the dynamic nature of immigration law.69 This places a
high burden on defense attorneys not only to recognize immigration
issues but also to give correct advice to their clients.70 The Court’s
plea could easily be determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was presumptively
mandatory and his counsel’s advice was incorrect.”); see Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,
485 (Ky. 2008) (Cunningham, J., dissenting) (“Counsel who gives erroneous advice to a client which
influences a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all. Common sense dictates that such deficient
lawyering goes to effectiveness. . . . I do not believe it is too much of a burden to place on our defense
bar the duty to say, ‘I do not know.”’).
66. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
67. Id. at 1486. (“Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the deportation
consequences of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor
in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a
conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.”).
68. Supreme Court Upholds Integrity of Criminal Justice System for Immigrants, DEFENDING
IMMIGRANTS
PARTNERSHIP
(Mar.
31,
2010),
http://defendingimmigrants.org/news/article.305930-Supreme_Court_Upholds_Integrity_of_Criminal_J
ustice_System_for_Immigrants. Michelle Fei, co-director of the Immigrant Defense Project, commented
on the Supreme Court’s decision: “We’re thrilled that the Supreme Court has recognized that
deportation is an extreme penalty and that noncitizens have a constitutional right to legal advice about
the consequences of pleading guilty.” Id.; see also OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY i (2010)
(noting that after Padilla, “it is even more important than ever for prosecutors, defense counsel, judges,
and other interested parties at the federal and local levels to have a basic understanding of the
immigration consequences that flow from an alien’s guilty plea”).
69. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court’s new approach is particularly
problematic because providing advice on whether a conviction for a particular offense will make an
alien removable is often quite complex.”); see also Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18,
at 21 (“The inconsistencies and uncertainties revealed in the passages from the ABA Criminal Lawyer’s
Guide to Immigration Law quoted by Justice Alito would be hilarious if the subject matter were not so
deadly serious.”).
70. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487–88 (emphasizing that criminal defense attorneys specialize in
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proposed resolution to the complexity of immigration law—that
when the law is “unclear or uncertain,” the attorney need only advise
a client that adverse immigration consequences may follow criminal
charges—does not provide sufficient guidelines or resources to
ensure noncitizens receive adequate representation.71
II. THE DIFFICULTY IN APPLYING PADILLA’S “SUCCINCT AND
STRAIGHTFORWARD” ANALYSIS TO IMMIGRATION LAW
The Supreme Court held, in Padilla v. Kentucky, that when
immigration consequences are “succinct, clear, and explicit” a
criminal defense attorney has the duty to give correct advice
regarding removal proceedings.72 The implication of this holding is
that it binds the criminal defense attorney’s obligation to the
complexity of the law.73 Justice Alito in his concurrence chastised the
majority’s approach, calling it a “vague, halfway test.”74 He argued
that this approach is problematic for many reasons.75 Primarily, he
noted that a defense attorney cannot always easily ascertain whether
the law is clear without having an expertise in immigration law.76
Secondly, he claimed that counsel might mislead defendants by
criminal proceedings and “it is unrealistic to expect them to provide expert advice on matters that lie
outside their area of training and experience”); see also Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note
18, at 21 (“That the Padilla holding rested squarely on the Sixth Amendment, however, makes clear that
counsel’s new duty extends to every criminal case—not just the 95 percent that result in guilty pleas, but
also those that go to trial.”).
71. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1491 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]f defense counsel must provide advice
regarding only one of the many collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, many defendants are
likely to be misled.”).
72. Id. at 1483.
73. Id.; see supra Part I.B.
74. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito concurred in the judgment
because he agreed with the Court that if an attorney misleads a client by giving incorrect advice about
removal proceedings, the attorney fails to provide effective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Id.
His opinion differed from the Court’s regarding the attorney’s obligation to his noncitizen client. Id. He
argued that if an attorney abstains from giving incorrect advice and instead advises a noncitizen that
immigration consequences may result from a conviction and the client may consult with an immigration
attorney regarding those consequences, then the attorney satisfies his duty to his client. Id. Under Justice
Alito’s approach, whether immigration law is clear or unclear, the defense attorney would not need to
decipher or explain the immigration consequences. Id.
75. Id. at 1490–92.
76. Id. at 1490 (“How can an attorney who lacks general immigration law expertise be sure that a
seemingly clear statutory provision actually means what it seems to say when read in isolation?”).
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advising about the risks of deportation because deportation is only
one of many collateral consequences of a conviction.77 Justice Alito’s
concurrence highlights the complexity and dynamic nature of
immigration law and demonstrates the discrepancy between the
Court’s decision and the actual practice of immigration law.78 While
the majority appropriately pointed out that determining the
consequences of Mr. Padilla’s plea merely required reading a statute,
most investigations into immigration law are not so easy.79
A. The Complex and Dynamic Nature of Immigration Law
Immigration law does not merely consist of statutes and
regulations that a criminal defense attorney can read to easily
determine the consequences of a plea or conviction.80 Instead,
immigration law consists of a complex mixture of statutes, policies,
memos, precedent, administrative decisions, and judicial decisions.81
Attorneys and their noncitizen clients facing criminal charges must
be aware of consequences that might result in the clients’ removal.82
77. Id. at 1491. Justice Alito also argued that a statute or other administrative reform is a more
appropriate remedy, and he argued that the majority’s decision usurps Sixth Amendment law. Id.
78. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at i–ii. The Office of Immigration Litigation
(OIL) prepared a monograph in response to the Padilla decision to provide prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges with a basic understanding of immigration law. Id. In its preface, the OIL noted
that it does not provide an in-depth analysis of immigration law because of its complexity and scope. Id.
It emphasized that “administrative and judicial precedents on immigration matters are far from uniform,
and determining what precedent to apply might be difficult because the removal proceeding may not be
completed in the same jurisdiction as the criminal proceeding.” Id.
79. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488–89 (Alito, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 1488. Justice Alito emphasized the complexity of immigration law due to the fact that
“‘[m]ost crimes affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the [Immigration and
Nationality Act], but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral
turpitude or aggravated felonies.’” Id. (quoting MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & LARRY M. EIG, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32480, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY summary (2006)).
81. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 1–22 (Stephanie L. Browning ed.
2006) (“Many immigration provisions created by Congress are inconsistent—be they provisions to
allow non-American citizens to enter the United States or provisions to effect their removal.
Immigration Law is a patchwork of promulgations and represents a tide-like shift between
restrictiveness and openness towards immigrants.”) (footnote omitted). See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 19, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (No. 08-651)
(“Advising defendants on immigration law in particular can involve complex legal and factual
questions—ranging from the characterization of an offense for immigration purposes, to naturalization
questions, to research into an alien defendant’s past immigration status—that are unfamiliar to many
criminal defense attorneys.”).
82. See BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 24.
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Removal in the immigration context means “the ejection of a person
from the United States.”83 A noncitizen may face removal either
through grounds of inadmissibility or deportability.84 A noncitizen
“seeking admission must overcome the inadmissibility grounds”
while a noncitizen “who has been admitted faces the deportability
grounds.”85 Inadmissibility, deportability and their relevant
provisions are often confused. Even the Office of Immigration
Litigation,86 which produced a monograph in response to Padilla’s
holding to aid defense attorneys, prosecutors, and federal and state
judges, incorrectly stated that a marijuana exception applies to
grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).87
This marijuana “exception” applies under the criminal grounds of
deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).88 The differences
83. Id.
84. Id. “Inadmissibility” and “deportability” are often confusing because in 1996 Congress passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). Id. This act made many
changes to immigration law, including the procedure for ejecting a person from the United States. Id.
Before IIRAIRA, noncitizens seeking admission were subject to inadmissibility grounds and went
before an Immigration Judge at “exclusion hearings.” Id. at 25. Noncitizens who entered the United
States were subject to deportability grounds at “deportability hearings.” Id. IIRAIRA combined
exclusion and deportation hearings into “removal hearings” that are for all noncitizens, regardless of
whether they are seeking admission or the government is trying to eject them following their admission.
Id.
85. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 25. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 212(a) covers
inadmissibility grounds, and INA section 237 covers deportability grounds. Id. at 24 n.7. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182, 1227 (2006). Inadmissibility applies to noncitizens who have not been legally admitted to the
United States, noncitizens who are physically present within the Untied States and want to change
status, and noncitizens who are returning from a trip abroad. Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 28
(explaining that a noncitizen returning from a trip abroad is treated as “someone entering the country for
the first time”). Deportability applies to noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States and are
later charged with being in the country in violation of the law. MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 56
(2003).
86. The Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) is part of the Department of Justice and is
responsible for handling and organizing all federal immigration litigation. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
LITIG., supra note 68, preface. The OIL features “experts in interpreting and applying [immigration]
statutes.” Id.
87. RAHA JORJANI, UNIV OF CAL. DAVIS, SCHOOL OF LAW, IMMIGRATION LAW CLINIC, ERRORS IN
OIL’S 2010 POST-PADILLA REFERENCE GUIDE: “IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY” (2010); see OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 67, at 11.
88. Jorjani, supra note 87; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (“Any alien who at any time
after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as
defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of
30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). The “petty offense exception” does not exempt the
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between inadmissibility and deportability are significant because the
consequences for a noncitizen who remains in the United States may
vary from a noncitizen who has the same conviction but travels
outside the United States.89
In addition to analyzing whether a client is subject to grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability, a criminal defense attorney must
analyze the conviction to determine “the proper classification of the
crime.”90 Making this classification is not an easy task. However, it is
a significant part of a noncitizen’s defense.91 Criminal defense
attorneys must be able to classify the crime to defend against severe
immigration consequences such as “guaranteed deportation.”92
Aggravated felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude are the
major categories of crimes in immigration law.93 In order for a
criminal defense attorney to understand and advise a client on the
immigration consequences, the attorney must initially categorize the
crime charged so that the attorney can then identify the possible
adverse consequences, the potential forms of relief, and possible
solutions for the accused.94
While crimes involving moral turpitude are listed throughout the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the INA never defines this
phrase.95 Crimes involving moral turpitude are defined by case law
and determined on a case-by-case basis unless controlled by clear
precedent.96 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)97 and other
noncitizen from deportation but merely permits the noncitizen to apply for a waiver, which is very
difficult to obtain. See Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 771, 776 (BIA 2009) (finding the fact
that the noncitizen’s conviction might fall within the petty offense exception to be “irrelevant” and
denying his application for cancellation of removal).
89. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 57 (“A person’s status and personal goals determine whether the
grounds of inadmissibility, deportability, or both, apply.”).
90. Id. at 75.
91. Id.
92. ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 152 (2d ed., 2006).
93. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75.
94. Id. at xxiii.
95. Id. at 76.
96. Id.
97. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is part of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office
for Immigration Review. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 154. The BIA reviews removal cases and
defensive benefit applications decided by Immigration Judges. Id. at 155.
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courts recognize crimes involving moral turpitude as conduct “that is
inherently dishonest, base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to
society in general.”98 A crime of moral turpitude makes a defendant
deportable when the potential sentencing term is one year or longer
and the noncitizen committed the offense within five years of his
admission to the United States.99 While the definition of crimes
involving moral turpitude includes crimes such as murder, it also
lumps crimes such as theft and aggravated assault into the same
category.100 A permanent resident who pleads no contest to
aggravated assault for waving a baseball bat and yelling “get out or
I’ll kill you” at trouble-makers will be deported for committing a
crime involving moral turpitude on the same grounds as a person
who attempted murder.101
The second category of crimes in immigration law is aggravated
felonies.102 Aggravated felony is a term of art defined statutorily as

98. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8. Examples of offenses that may constitute
crimes involving moral turpitude include murder, voluntary manslaughter, theft offenses, forgery,
kidnapping, mayhem, rape, fraud, spousal abuse, child abuse, and driving under the influence without a
license. Id.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006); OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8. A
noncitizen is inadmissible for committing a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 10. The OIL, however,
again made an error regarding the petty offense exception to inadmissibility:
The exception applies to offenses for which the maximum possible term of imprisonment
does not exceed one year. OIL misstates this exception as “for which the maximum
possible term of imprisonment was less than one year.” This is significant because under
California law, for example, a misdemeanor where the actual sentence didn’t exceed 6
months may qualify under the exception because the possible term of imprisonment for a
California Misdemeanor does not exceed one year. OIL’s error, if relied upon, would
mistakenly signal to parties that a California misdemeanor conviction cannot be crafted in
such a way as to fall within the petty offense exception and thereby avoid or mitigate
certain immigration consequences.
JORJANI, supra note 87, at 1 (quoting OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 11).
100. See KRAMER, supra note 85, at 76–82. In determining whether a crime is one involving moral
turpitude, certain offenses should be examined specially. Id. at 78. For example, the BIA has determined
that theft crimes involve moral turpitude only when a “permanent taking is intended.” Id. (citing V-Z-S,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1360 n.12 (B.I.A. 2000)). “[J]oyriding, failure to return a rental car, and similar
situations that do not involve stealing with an intent to permanently deprive an owner of a property right
may not—depending on the statute at hand—involve moral turpitude.” Id.
101. Id. at xxi, 80.
102. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49.
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well as by BIA and federal court decisions.103 The definition,
however, is only a list of those offenses considered aggravated
felonies.104 The definition includes offenses such as murder,105
trafficking of controlled substances,106 money laundering if the
amount exceeds $10,000,107 and theft or burglary if the term of
imprisonment is for at least one year.108 The definition is far
reaching, including offenses that are not felonies under state or
federal law.109 A conviction for an aggravated felony has serious
consequences and renders a noncitizen removable at any time.110
The dynamic nature of crimes of moral turpitude and aggravated
felonies further complicates their analysis. While criminal defense
attorneys may be tempted to rely on a prepared list of crimes
involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies, they will do so to
the detriment of their clients.111 The Office of Immigration Litigation
(OIL) gives a list of offenses that may constitute crimes involving
moral turpitude, including “driving under the influence without a
license.”112 This list, however, may mislead attorneys.113 While in the
Ninth Circuit driving under the influence “with knowledge that the
driver is prohibited from driving with a suspended or otherwise
restricted license” is a crime involving moral turpitude, two statutes
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006); BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 n.134.
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). The INA specifies all the various aggravated felony offenses in §
1101(a)(43)(A–U).
109. BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 (citing United States v. Marin-Navarette, 244 F.3d 1284 (11th
Cir. 2001); Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448 (B.I.A. 2002).
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006); BOSWELL, supra note 81, at 49 (“A person convicted of an
aggravated felony will not be able to avail him- or herself of a waiver of deportability grounds or relief
from removal . . . [and] he or she will not later be eligible for re-admission.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)
(2006)).
111. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75 (“Every client’s case presents a unique set of facts and
circumstances that must be reviewed in light of both the specific offense conduct and the applicable
criminal statute involved. . . . Relying on charts, graphs, and other written ‘sound bites’ for the quick
and easy answer can lead to mistakes in the long run.”); Jorjani, supra note 87 (explaining that the
definition of a crime involving moral turpitude is “unclear” and warning that one circuit court has called
the determination of a crime involving moral turpitude “a nebulous question” (citing Ocegueda-Nunez
v. Holder, 594 F.3d. 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 2010))).
112. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, at 8.
113. Jorjani, supra note 87.
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cannot be combined to create an offense that would fit this
definition.114 Hence in California, a conviction of a simple driving
under the influence (DUI) and driving without a license—which are
two separate crimes each without an intent requirement—cannot be
combined to constitute a crime involving moral turpitude.115
B. Citizenship and Conviction: Words with Special Meaning in
Immigration Law
While criminal defense attorneys may feel more comfortable
working with terms like “citizenship” and “conviction” because they
are more familiar than terms like “crimes involving moral turpitude”
and “aggravated felonies”, the concepts all have special meaning in
immigration law.116 An inquiry into citizenship is vital for criminal
defense attorneys. If a client is a citizen, the client is not subject to
grounds of deportability or inadmissibility, and the defense attorney
can then negotiate for pleas without worrying about the client’s
immigration status.117
The majority opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky, however, fails to
establish how far practitioners must go to determine citizenship.118
While one client’s status “could be easily determined” by looking at
a birth certificate, the analysis required for other clients may not be
so “succinct and straightforward.”119 The inquiry into citizenship
should not end with a determination that the client was born outside
the United States—a criminal defense attorney must follow up with
114. Id. (citing Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)) (“The
elements of a crime involving moral turpitude must be found in the statute of conviction.”).
115. Id.
116. Unfortunately, mistakes concerning citizenship are common, and “[h]undreds of thousands of
Latino United States citizens were wrongfully deported to Mexico during the last century . . . .” TOOBY,
supra note 12, at 9; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1489 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“[I]t may be hard, in some cases, for defense counsel even to determine whether a client is an alien.”
(footnote omitted)); KRAMER, supra note 85, at 1 (“Some people, believe it or not, may be American
citizens through derivation and not even know it.”).
117. KRAMER, supra note 85, at 1.
118. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1489–90 (Alito, J., concurring); see also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
119. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483; BOSWELL, supra note 79, at 176 (“Whether an individual acquired
citizenship at birth abroad where one or both parents are U.S. citizens is a complex question controlled
by statute.”).
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questions about where the client’s parents and grandparents were
born.120 Attorneys who limit their inquiry into citizenship to easily
ascertainable means, such as a mere question on an intake sheet, may
incorrectly advise their client as an immigrant when their client is a
citizen, or advise their client as a citizen when the client is only a
legal permanent resident.121 An attorney must therefore seek
documentation of citizenship.122
Conviction is another term where the criminal defense attorney’s
familiarity with the concept may be more harmful than helpful.
Before an attorney can provide advice on the consequences of an
action, the attorney must first determine whether an offense
constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes. However, a state’s
definition of “conviction” may not match up with the INA’s
expansive definition of “conviction.”123 Examples of valid
convictions under the INA include pleas, deferred adjudications, a
court martial’s entering of guilty judgment, probation before
judgment, guilty pleas held in abeyance, and all costs that constitute

120. BOSWELL, supra note 79, at 176. When a noncitizen is born abroad, the noncitizen may acquire
citizenship through a U.S. citizen; however, this acquisition depends on the date of the individual’s birth
and the law at the time of birth. Id. The determination also depends on whether the noncitizen was born
out of wedlock and for how long the U.S. citizen parent lived in the United States. Id.; see IRA J.
KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK app. B (12th ed. 2010) (providing multiple
charts that outline the requirements and laws concerning automatic acquisition of citizenship and tables
that show the transmission requirements for individuals born abroad, depending on the date of birth).
121. See TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8–9. An intake information sheet should reflect a much more
comprehensive inquiry. Id. at 190–91. Questions should include an inquiry into where the client was
born; whether the client’s mother is a U.S. citizen and, if so, whether she is a citizen by birth or
naturalization; and whether the client’s father is a U.S. citizen and, if so, whether he is a citizen by birth
or naturalization. Id.
122. TOOBY, supra note 12, at 8 (“Common documentation of U.S. citizenship includes a birth
certificate establishing that the client was born in the United States (or a listed possession); a United
States passport [or] a U.S. Certificate of Citizenship . . . ; a U.S. Certificate of Naturalization . . . or a
U.S. Citizen Identification Card . . . .”).
123. TOOBY, supra note 12, at 48; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006) (“(A) The term “conviction” means,
with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of
guilt has been withheld, where— (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the
judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to
include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.”); see,
e.g., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-1.
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“punishment” or “penalty.”124 A deferred adjudication is when the
judge sentences a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere but
does not enforce the sentence at that time.125 If the defendant
completes requirements such as probation or community service, the
charges are dismissed; however, for immigration law purposes, even
if the charges are dismissed the adjudication is still considered a
conviction.126 The statutory definition of “conviction” does not
require finality in the normal sense of the word, but instead, finality
lies at the point where either there is a “formal judgment of guilt” or
a “sufficient finding of guilt and the imposition of punishment.”127
Even state convictions vacated for “rehabilitative purposes” remain
valid convictions for immigration purposes in some circuits.128
C. Criminal Defense Attorneys in Georgia Post-Padilla
Despite the complexities of immigration law and determining
whether an offense constitutes a conviction for immigration purposes
and the consequences of that conviction, criminal defense attorneys
in Georgia do not have a wealth of resources. While the majority in
Padilla v. Kentucky deemed it essential that an attorney advise a
client as to whether the client’s plea carries a risk of deportation, the
opinion failed to provide attorneys with the tools to meet this
124. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-2–C-3; see Hendrix & Orza, supra note
40, at 28 (“Georgia’s First Offender Statute is a deferred adjudication program. Thus, the INA considers
a ‘guilty’ plea entered under the First Offender Program to be a conviction.” (citing Ga. Code Ann. §
42-8-60 (2007))).
125. Hendrix & Orza, supra note 40, at 28.
126. Id. (“The only instance when a deferred adjudication is not considered a conviction is when the
sentencing court merely orders the defendant to pay court costs.”).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006); see Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 629
F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2011). In Mejia Rodriguez, a Honduran was denied renewal of temporary protected
status (TPS) because of two prior offenses. Id. at 1225. He argued that the charges brought in state court
for marijuana possession and driving with a suspended license did not amount to a “conviction.” Id. The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that the state court’s acceptance of a plea, its “finding of guilt,” and
the fact that it “imposed a sentence of time served” constituted a “formal judgment of guilt” and was
therefore a “conviction.” Id. at 1228.
128. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIG., supra note 68, app. at C-2; see Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d
263, 266 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A conviction vacated for rehabilitative or immigration reasons remains valid
for immigration purposes, while one vacated because of procedural or substantive infirmities does
not.”); Ali v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 443 F.3d 804, 810–11 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the
defendant’s conviction was not vacated for procedural or substantive purposes when he mistakenly
thought a guilty plea under the First Offender Act would constitute an acquittal).
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obligation.129 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in
Smith v. State130 did little to alleviate this burden. In Smith, a
noncitizen asserted that the trial court violated Georgia Code section
17-7-93(c) by “failing to advise him on the record” of the possible
immigration consequences of his plea.131 The court held that a
noncitizen must establish that “withdrawal is needed to correct a
manifest injustice” to make a claim against the state for the court’s
failure.132 The court recognized the burden of informing noncitizens
of the risk of deportation and emphasized that it was an “unrealistic
burden” to have the trial court determine “all of the potential
important consequences of the plea to the particular defendant
appearing before the court.”133 The court, however, did not claim this
was an unrealistic burden for defenders. Instead of having trial courts
share the obligation to inform clients of the adverse immigration
consequences of a plea, the court declared that Georgia Code section
17-7-93(c) is a statutory right and the noncitizen’s relief resided in
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.134
In Georgia, with the growing number of consequences attorneys
must communicate to their clients and the complex nature of
immigration law, some defense attorneys may be tempted to rely on
129. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1490 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the
Court’s answer to “the severity of the burden it imposes on defense counsel” is to hinge the obligation
on the difficulty of determining the consequences).
130. Smith v. State, 697 S.E.2d 177 (Ga. 2010).
131. Id. at 180. The State conceded that the trial court failed to satisfy Georgia Code Section 17-793(c); however, the court maintained that the noncitizen could not show “manifest injustice” in order to
withdraw his plea. Id. at 181; see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-93(c) (2010) (“[T]he court shall determine
whether the defendant is freely entering the plea with an understanding that if he or she is not a citizen
of the United States, then the plea may have an impact on his or her immigration status. This subsection
shall apply with respect to acceptance of any plea of guilty to any state offense in any court of this state
or any political subdivision of this state.”).
132. Smith, 697 S.E.2d at 186. To satisfy a manifest injustice, the noncitizen would have to show “(1)
that he is not a citizen; (2) that the facts, viewed in conjunction with the immigration laws, show some
real risk to his immigration status; (3) that no one ever advised him of those risks; and (4) that if he had
known of the risks, he would have refused to plead guilty and taken his chances at trial.” Id. at 187.
133. Id. at 184.
134. Id. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court did not mandate extending direct consequences
to include adverse effects on immigration status and therefore held that the “impact that a guilty plea
might have on a defendant’s immigration status is a collateral consequence of the plea, so that the trial
court’s failure to advise a defendant regarding the potential impact does not require that the guilty plea
be set aside as a matter of constitutional law.” Id. at 184–85.
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lists of crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies.135
However, as the Supreme Court noted in Padilla, with the growing
severity of immigration law, it is essential that criminal defense
attorneys at a minimum know how to research the crime in order to
determine the impact of the offense.136 Otherwise, the Padilla
holding will fail to ensure “that no criminal defendant—whether a
citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel’” and
instead will multiply instances of affirmative misrepresentation.137
III. PROPOSAL FOR GEORGIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS TO
UPHOLD PADILLA
Georgia criminal defense attorneys, to meet the Padilla holding,
must establish a comprehensive service plan for providing
representation to noncitizens that includes self-education and actively
fostering collaborations with immigration attorneys. For public
defenders with a burdensome caseload, this task will be daunting.
However, to effectively represent their clients after Padilla, they
must consider immigration consequences, and comprehensive service
plans will provide defense attorneys with the most effective tools to
ease the burden. While statutory relief providing defense attorneys
with more resources would be ideal, given the current politics of
immigration, it is not likely that Georgia will pass legislation giving
defense attorneys funding to represent noncitizens.138 Therefore,
135. See Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a failure to advise a
noncitizen that pleading guilty will require the noncitizen to register as a sex offender “is
constitutionally deficient performance”). The court relied on the Padilla decision to extend
representation to informing a client on sex offender registration because “like deportation, registration as
a sex offender is ‘intimately related to the criminal process’ in that it is an ‘automatic result’ following
certain criminal convictions.” Id. at 388 (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010));
Love & Chin, The Right to Counsel, supra note 18, at 22.
136. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–80; KRAMER, supra note 85, at 75 (“It is key that the practitioner
understand how to analyze the elements of a crime and do the research on his or her own, rather than
rely on a chart or graph to give the quick answer.”).
137. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
138. See Jeremy Redmon, Governor Signs Arizona-Style Immigration Bill into Law, ATLANTA J.CONST. (May 13, 2011 6:26 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-politics-elections/governor-signsarizona-style-944703.html; see also Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
argued that legislation could have more appropriately resolved the problems of warning of immigration
consequences rather than the Court’s constitutional holding:

Published by Reading Room, 2012

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 15

914

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

defense attorneys will need to take a comprehensive and active
approach to defending their noncitizen clients.
Instead of structuring their representation to their clients on
whether immigration law is “succinct and straightforward,” criminal
defense attorneys should avoid the Supreme Court’s “vague halfway
test” altogether.139 Their approach should begin with self-education
through various manuals and books as well as attending immigration
defense trainings specifically tailored for criminal defense attorneys.
Georgia practitioners should couple this foundational understanding
of immigration law with outside resources such as collaborations
with immigration attorneys and local nonprofit organizations.
“Immigration Service Plans” also offer public defenders another
avenue to ensure that their offices provide effective assistance of
counsel to noncitizen clients.140 These proposals, while applicable to
all criminal defense attorneys in Georgia, are tailored to public
defenders and the challenges of working with limited resources, and
they aim to help attorneys go beyond the bare minimum requirements
of Padilla.
A. Education Through Self-Study and Trainings
Georgia criminal defense attorneys should use the numerous
websites and resources online to learn more about their obligations to
their clients after Padilla. The Immigrant Defense Project and the
Immigrant Legal Resource Center both have published practice
advisories for criminal defense lawyers.141 These organizations are
The Court’s holding prevents legislation that could solve the problem addressed by
today’s opinions in a more precise and targeted fashion. If the subject had not been
constitutionalized, legislation could specify which categories of misadvice about matters
ancillary to the prosecution invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences
counsel must bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given.
Id.
139. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring); see discussion supra Part II.
140. PETER L. MARKOWITZ, PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER
IMMIGRATION SERVICE PLAN 6 (2009) (studying various public defender offices and providing various
components necessary for defenders in representing noncitizen clients).
141. KATHERINE BRADY & ANGIE JUNCK, A DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE
ADVISORY: STEPS TO ADVISING A NONCITIZEN DEFENDANT UNDER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 1 (2010);
MANUEL D. VARGAS, A DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP PRACTICE ADVISORY: DUTY OF
CRIMINAL DEFENSE COUNSEL REPRESENTING AN IMMIGRANT DEFENDANT AFTER PADILLA V.
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partners in the Defending Immigrants Partnership, a collaboration of
criminal defense and immigrant advocates who have expertise in
minimizing or avoiding immigration consequences of convictions.142
These advisories not only highlight the significant points of the
Padilla decision and the ramifications for defense attorneys, but they
also provide checklists of immigration consequences for certain
convictions and explain how practitioners can handle representing
immigration consequences.143 The Defending Immigrants Partnership
website includes a sample intake sheet that provides a section for
noncitizen defendants to state their goals such as “avoid conviction
that triggers deportation,” “preserve eligibility to obtain future
immigration benefits,” or “get out of jail ASAP.”144 Georgia defense
attorneys should use these online resources as a guide to highlight
relevant immigration issues that will arise during the defense process.
Defense attorneys must supplement this introduction into
immigration consequences resulting from criminal dispositions with
formal training offered by a local bar association. The Southern
Public Defender Training Center offered a two-day training to new
public defenders to introduce them to their legal and ethical
obligations in representing noncitizens.145 The training covered the
steps public defenders should take to meet Padilla and provided an
overview of immigration law and drug offenses, property crimes,
KENTUCKY 1 (2010).
142. About the Defending Immigrants Partnership, DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS PARTNERSHIP,
http://defendingimmigrants.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010) (“The Partnership offers defender
programs and individual defense counsel critical resources and training about the immigration
consequences of crimes, actively encourages and supports development of in-house immigration
specialists in defender programs, forges connections between local criminal defenders and immigration
advocates, and provides defenders technical assistance in criminal cases.”).
143. VARGAS, supra note 141, at 2–6.
144. WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N’S IMMIGRATION PROJECT, SAMPLE INTAKE FOR DEFENDER OFFICE,
(2010), available at http://www.probono.net/library/attachment.171728. The options for noncitizen
defendants to choose from when declaring their overall goal of representation are to “avoid conviction
that triggers deportation,” “preserve eligibility to obtain future immigrations (e.g. LPR status or
citizenship),” “preserve ability to ask immigration judge to get/keep lawful status [and] stay in U.S.,”
“get out of jail ASAP,” and “immigration consequences, including deportation are not a priority.” Id.
145. Immigration Law Training, DEFENDER CONNECTIONS (The Southern Public Defender Training
Center, Atlanta, Ga.), Fall 2010, available at http://www.thespdtc.org/uploads/Defender_ConnectionsFall_2010.pdf. The Southern Public Defender Training Center provides new public defenders with
training to help them better represent their clients. Id.
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crimes against persons, the definition of conviction for immigration
purposes, detention, and crime-related immigration laws.146 Other
local bar associations and organizations offered trainings that cater to
a broader group of attorneys.147 On November 12, 2010, the
Immigration Section and Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of
Georgia co-sponsored training on Immigration Consequences of
Criminal Activity.148 The training covered definitions of crimes
involving moral turpitude and aggravated felonies and their
significance for convictions; the effect of criminal dispositions on
relief from removal such as waivers and adjustment of status; and
significant federal and Board of Immigration Appeals cases
concerning criminal issues and immigration.149 Georgia attorneys
conducted this training, offering attendees their experience in
immigration and Georgia law as well as knowledge of the local
courts and local resources.150
B. Collaborations: Bringing Immigration and Criminal Defense
Attorneys Together
Other states have successfully formed collaborations between their
public defender offices and local immigration organizations.151
Several states, such as Colorado and Massachusetts, have a central
office with immigration experts who provide knowledge and advice
for various defense attorney offices.152 Many of these experts were
former public defenders, so they are able to provide information on
the consequences of convictions with both the immigration and
146. Id. The training was conducted by staff from the Immigrant Defense Project. Id.
147. See PADILLA CENTRAL: THE CLEARINGHOUSE FOR PADILLA V. KENTUCKY,
http://www.padillacentral.com/home/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
148. INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. IN GA., IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY PROGRAM MATERIALS (2010) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
149. Id.
150. Id. Presenters included Marshall Cohen from Cohen & Associates, Carolina Antonini from
Antonini Law Firm, and Jean C. Sperling from Compano & Sperling. Id.
151. Brief of the National Ass’n, supra note 61, at 32–39 (highlighting the successful efforts of states
and local organizations to provide immigration advice with defender offices either through “ad hoc”
guidance or through “formal structures”).
152. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 12–13. Other offices using a central office to offer immigration
expertise to various defenders are the New York Legal Aid Society and the Los Angeles County Public
Defender Office. Id. at 13.
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criminal systems in mind.153 Another benefit to this system is the low
cost required to employ the program.154 Other states have in-house
immigration attorneys to provide immigration advice and expertise to
defense attorneys as well as clients.155 In-house specialists not only
enable defense attorneys to ask questions and follow up, but also
provide offices the opportunity to incorporate immigration issues into
the everyday routine.156
A different option for offices on a more local level is to contract
with immigration advocacy organizations to handle the immigration
issues that arise during the defense process. The California State
Public Defender contracts with the Immigrant Legal Resource
Center, an organization that has expertise in the defense of
noncitizens, paying for only as much immigration advice as it
needs.157 However, a limitation of contracting with immigration
experts for advice is that they do not provide direct client services.158
For an office that wants to ensure its clients have direct access to
immigration expertise, it could implement a system where it shares
an immigration attorney with a local service provider.159 The
Defender Association of Philadelphia employs this system that not
only allows direct access, but additionally fosters cooperation and
education between immigration and criminal defense attorneys.160
Criminal defense attorneys in Georgia should look to these models
and choose a system that caters to the needs of their offices. In the
Atlanta area there are two main nonprofit organizations that offer
immigration services for low-income clients: Catholic Charities
Atlanta and the Latin American Association.161 These organizations
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 10–11. Offices that use in-house immigration experts include the Bronx Defenders,
Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, Defender Association of Philadelphia, Public Defender
Service for the District of Columbia, and the Monroe County Public Defenders Office. Id.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id. at 14.
158. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 14.
159. Id. at 11–12.
160. Id. at 12.
161. Immigration
Legal
Services,
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
ATLANTA,
http://www.catholiccharitiesatlanta.org/services/immigration-legal-services/immigration-legal-services/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011); Immigration Services Offered by the Latin American Association, LATIN
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offer services such as helping clients obtain legal status, assisting
clients in naturalization, and legal representation in removal
defense.162 Criminal defense attorneys can reach out to these
organizations to foster collaboration. Additionally, offices can
contact the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) to
connect to other immigration attorneys in Georgia.163 Through one of
these options, criminal defense attorneys in Georgia should be able to
mirror the success of partnerships in other states and provide their
noncitizen clients with immigration advice.
C. Immigration Service Plans
“Immigration Service Plans” is a term describing the various
approaches public defender offices can take to provide their
noncitizen clients with effective representation.164 There are five
components to an Immigration Service Plan: an advice component,
an information-gathering component, a language access component,
a staff development component, and a direct immigration service or
referral component.165 Defender offices can choose certain
components depending on their funding and create a service plan that
will help alleviate the burden for individual defense attorneys, thus
assuring that offices can deliver correct immigration advice in a
timely manner.166
AM. ASS’N, http://www.thelaa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=83&l
ang=en (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
162. Immigration Services Offered by the Latin American Association, LATIN AM. ASS’N,
http://www.thelaa.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=61&Itemid=83&lang=en (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010). To reach the Latin American Association, call (404) 471-1889. Immigration
Legal
Services,
CATHOLIC
CHARITIES
ATLANTA,
http://www.catholiccharitiesatlanta.org/services/immigration-legal-services/immigration-legal-services/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). Catholic Charities specializes in helping victims of domestic violence,
neglected foreign children, detained immigrants, and victims of crimes and trafficking. Id. To reach the
Immigration Legal Services department, call (404) 885-7454. Id.
163. AILA INFONET, http://www.aila.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2010). The American Immigration
Law Association website has a feature called “Find a Lawyer,” where defense attorneys can search for
immigration lawyers based on location and the type of advice needed on topics such as adoption,
employer sanctions, and student visas. Id.
164. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 6–7.
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id. at 6–7. The Immigrant Defense Project and New York State Defenders Association surveyed
leading public defenders offices throughout the country about the approaches they take to providing
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The Immigration Service Plan components break down the issues
defender offices should focus on when representing noncitizen
clients. First, defender offices must decide how to advise their clients
on immigration consequences of criminal activity through one of the
collaboration options discussed above.167 Second, offices must
consider how to collect information from noncitizens about their
immigration status, how to convey this information to immigration
experts, and how to store this information within the office.168 Third,
public defender offices must determine how to handle language
barriers. Options include using family members as interpreters,
having bilingual staff members, providing document translation, and
using language services in court.169 Fourth, offices must not only
train their defenders, but also keep them updated on current
immigration law and practice techniques.170 Finally, defender offices
should make sure clients have access to immigration services when
adjusting immigration status or when facing removal proceedings.171
Otherwise offices “invest the time, energy, and resources into
developing an Immigration Service Plan but then do nothing to
ensure that the office’s hard work at mitigating immigration
consequences bears real fruit when a client actually faces federal
immigration authorities.”172 An office that adopts an Immigration
Service Plan will give its defenders the necessary tools and resources
to represent noncitizen clients and eliminate the temptation to only do
the bare minimum under Padilla.
While offices may recognize the need for an Immigration Service
Plan, implementing it may be a struggle. In Georgia, offices should
start with surveying the noncitizen population in their city or county
to determine the need and then identify the possible funding sources

immigration advice. Id. at 1. They created this protocol to aid defenders in meeting the challenges of
representing noncitizens. Id.
167. Id. at 6; see supra Part III.B.
168. MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 20.
169. Id. at 23–25.
170. Id. at 22.
171. Id. at 26.
172. Id.
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they may use to meet this need.173 While the state or county might be
the most logical source of funding, some offices will be unable to
generate enough resources to meet the needs of their noncitizen
clients. These offices can look to other resources such as
postgraduate fellowships, grants, or fundraising.174 Another option
for offices is to phase in the Immigration Service Plan so the office
has time to obtain funding.175 While implementing the program may
meet challenges, public defender offices should emphasize that they
can only meet the Padilla holding through a comprehensive service
plan.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Padilla put a significant burden on criminal
defense attorneys when it ruled that noncitizen clients have a claim to
ineffective assistance of counsel when defense attorneys fail to
advise of or affirmatively misrepresent to their clients the
immigration consequences of criminal activity.176 However, given
the severity of immigration law, this holding was necessary to protect
the noncitizen’s Sixth Amendment right.177 Immigration law is
complex, requiring more than just reading a statute. Criminal defense
attorneys will need to learn not only the vocabulary, but also how to
classify the crimes and analyze the possible consequences.178
Criminal defense attorneys can meet the challenge posed by Padilla
and the complexity of immigration law by educating themselves and
fostering collaborations with immigration attorneys. As the
connection between criminal and immigration law grows stronger,
these relationships will be essential in representing noncitizen
clients.179 Defenders must step up to the Padilla holding with a
determination to effectively represent their clients.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 28–29.
MARKOWITZ, supra note 140, at 29.
Id. at 30.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
Id. at 1486.
See supra Part II.A–B.
KRAMER, supra note 85, at xxiii (“Today, the bond between immigration and criminal law is
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more significant than ever before, [and] [a]s the immigration population grows larger in the United
States, the criminal-alien provisions of the law grow harsher.”).
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